Showing 1 - 10 of 10
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010006913
In a democracy, a political majority can influence both the corporategovernance structure and the return to human and financial capital.We argue that when financial wealth is sufficiently diffused, thereis political support for a strong governance role for dispersed equitymarket investors, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256718
We present a positive theory of capital market frictions that raise the cost of capital for new firms and lower the cost of capital for incumbent firms. Capital market frictions arise from a political conflict across voters who differ in two dimensions: (i) a fraction of voters owns capital, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011133657
This paper integrates the problem of designing corporate bankruptcy rules into a theory of optimal debt structure. We show that, in an incomplete contract framework with imperfect renegotiation, having multiple creditors increases a firm's debt capacity while increasing its incentives to default...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005518801
This paper integrates the problem of designing corporate bankruptcy rules into a theory of optimal debt structure. We show that, in an incomplete-contracts framework with imperfect renegotiation, having multiple creditors increases a firm's debt capacity while increasing its incentives to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005518813
Legislation affects corporate governance and the return to human and financial capital. We allow the preference of a political majority to determine both the governance structure and the extent of labor rents. In a society where median voters have relatively more at stake in the form of human...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005518855
The rapidly growing literature studying the relationship between legal origin, investor protection, and finance has stimulated an important debate in academic circles. It has also generated a number of applied research projects and strong policy statements. This paper discusses the implications,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005481763
In a democracy, a political majority can influence both the corporate
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005042222
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001733928
In a democracy, a political majority can influence both the corporategovernance structure and the return to human and financial capital.We argue that when financial wealth is sufficiently diffused, thereis political support for a strong governance role for dispersed equitymarket investors, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325412