In repeated public good experiments, reciprocity helps to sustain high levels of cooperation. Can this be achieved by location choices in addition to making contributions? It is more realistic to rely on an intuitive neighborhood model for community members who interact repeatedly. In our...

Approximate truth refers to the principle that border cases should be analyzed by solving generic cases and solving border cases as limits of generic ones (Brennan et al., 2008). Our study experimentally explores whether this conceptual principle is also behaviorally appealing. To do so, we...

We present an experiment where two players bargain with a third player. They can bargain either separately or form a joint venture to bargain collectively. Our theoretical benchmark solution predicts decentralized bargaining, as only one player has an interest in forming a joint venture....

Most models of labor markets and (un)employment neglect how competition among firms or sectors of the economy affects their hiring of workers and working times. Our approach pays special attention to such effects by proposing a complex stage game where firms invest in capital equipment before...

Starting point of our (indirect) evolutionary analysis is the sequential bargaining model of Manning (1987) who distinguishes between trade union's power in initial wage and in later employment negotiations. By linking two such collective bargaining situations we can say which of the two...

In a duopoly market, aspiration levels express how much sellers want to earn given their expectations about the other's behavior. We augment the sellers' decision task by eliciting their profit aspiration. In a first experimental phase, whenever satisficing is not possible, sales choices, point...

This paper shows, that after observing the investment decisions by firm owners their employees can engage in costly training, thus increasing their general and firm-specific productivity, which also depends on capital endowment...

If the future market wage is uncertain, engaging in long{term employment is risky, withthe risk depending on how regulated the labor market is. In our experiment long{term employment can result either from oering long{term contracts or from repeatedlyand mutually opting for rematching....