We develop a dynamic model of strategic investment in the Eurasian transport system fornatural gas. In the absence of international contract enforcement, countries may distortinvestment in order to increase their bargaining power, resulting in underinvestment incheap and/or overinvestment in...

Diese Arbeit besteht aus drei zusammengehörigen Essays, die eine theoretische Grundlage für Untersuchungen multilateraler Verhandlungen und strategischer Investitionen in drei unterschiedlichen Umgebungen liefert. Die vorgestellten Methoden werden angewandt um Entwicklungen in der eurasischen...

Russian natural gas is delivered to Western Europe by pipelines, running throughUkraine, Poland and other transit countries. We derive the bargaining power of thedifferent players along this supply chain endogenously from the architecture of thetransmission system and its possible extensions by...

We propose a variant of the incomplete contract framework to analyze strategicinvestment in international transport networks, where investment is observable andsome, but not all, players cannot make long-term commitments regarding accessto their transport infrastructure. Those players who can...

We analyze how investment into the pipeline system supplying Russian natural gas to WesternEurope is distorted for strategic reasons. We use a two stage multilateral bargaining game amongheterogenous players, some lacking the ability to make long-term commitments. At the first stagethe players...

We use cooperative game theory to analyze how the architecture of the pipeline network determines the power structure in the supply chain for Russian gas. If the assessment is narrowly focused on the abilities to obstruct flows in the existing system, the main transit countries, Belarus and...