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A firm with stochastic demand can rely on hired hands when demand is low and rent additional labour when demand is higher. For high demand this implies the co-employment of hired hands, paid directly by the firm, and of rented hands who are paid by a rental agency. This may cause severe problems...
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We study the relevance of fairness norms in an experimental scenario in which hired and rented hands are co-employed and stochastic influences and multiple reference points for fairness further increase complexity. Co-employment of hired and rented hands is an example out of a broader class of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005736919
A firm with stochastic demand can rely on hired hands when demand is low and rent additional labour when demand is higher. For high demand this implies the co-employment of hired hands, paid directly by the firm, and of rented hands who are paid by a rental agency. This may cause severe problems...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005588004
We study the relevance of fairness norms in an experimental scenario in which hired and rented hands are co-employed and stochastic influences and multiple reference points for fairness further increase complexity. Co-employment of hired and rented hands is an example out of a broader class of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014053091
A two-persons bargaining problem often consists of initially incompatible demands that can be unilaterally reduced by sequential concessions. In a 2 x 2 x 2-factorial design we distinguish between reliable and unreliable concessions, between a static and dynamic settings and between symmetric...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866602
We study an ultimatum experiment in which the responder does not know the offer when accepting or rejecting. Unconditional veto power leads to acceptances, although proposers are significantly greedier than in standard ultimatum games, and this is anticipated by responders.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866673
A procurement contract is granted by a bureaucrat (the auctioneer)who is interested in a low price and a bribe from the provider.The optimal bids and bribes are derived based on an iid private costassumption. In the experiment, bribes are negatively framed (betweensubjectstreatment) to capture...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866715