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I will survive! : An experimental study of gender specific saving decisions by couples
Büchner, Susanne - 2002
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013432704
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New experimental results on the solidarity game
Büchner, Susanne; Coricelli, Giorgio; Greiner, Ben - 2003
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001857070
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New experimental results on the solidarity game
Büchner, Susanne; Coricelli, Giorgio; Greiner, Ben - 2003
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001863374
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Bribery and public procurement : an experimental study
Büchner, Susanne; Freytag, Andreas; González, Luis G.; … - 2006
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003288434
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Conventions for implementing conventions : an evolutionary and experimental analysis
Büchner, Susanne; Güth, Werner; Miller, Luis M. - 2005
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003032875
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Incentive contracts versus trust in three-person ultimatum games : an experimental study
Büchner, Susanne; Gonzáles, Luis; Güth, Werner; … - 2002
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013432567
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Monitoring and pay : an experiment on employee performance under endogenous supervision
Dittrich, Dennis; Kocher, Martin - 2006 - This version: 26 September 2006
We present an experimental test of a shirking model where monitoring intensity is endogenous and effort a continuous variable. Wage level, monitoring intensity and consequently the desired enforceable effort level are jointly determined by the maximization problem of the firm. As a result,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011349705
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Loss aversion and learning to bid
Dittrich, Dennis A. V.; Güth, Werner; Kocher, Martin; … - 2005
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002596541
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Monitoring and pay : an experiment on employee performance under endogenous supervision
Dittrich, Dennis; Kocher, Martin - 2011 - This version: 11 January 2011
We present an experimental test of a shirking model where monitoring intensity is endogenous and effort a continuous variable. Wage level, monitoring intensity and consequently the desired enforceable effort level are jointly determined by the maximization problem of the firm. As a result,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009124629
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Monitoring and pay : an experiment on employee performance under endogenous supervison
Dittrich, Dennis; Kocher, Martin - 2006
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003377699