Sick-pay is a common provision in labor contracts. It insures workersagainst a sudden loss of income due to unexpected absences andhelps them smooth consumption. Therefore, many governments findsick-pay socially desirable and choose to mandate its provision. Butsick-pay is not without its...

It is well known that the rock-paper-scissors game has no pure saddle point. Weshow that this holds more generally: A symmetric two-player zero-sum game hasa pure saddle point if and only if it is not a generalized rock-paper-scissors game.Moreover, we show that every finite symmetric...

We show that for many classes of symmetric two-player games, the simple decision rule \imitate-the-best" can hardly be beaten by any other decision rule. Weprovide necessary and sufficient conditions for imitation to be unbeatable and showthat it can only be beaten by much in games that are of...

Sick pay is a common provision in most labor contracts. This paper employs an experimental gift-exchange environment to explore two related questions using both managers and undergraduates as subjects. First, do workers reciprocate sick pay in the same way as they reciprocate wage payments?...

Sick pay is a common provision in most labor contracts. This paper employs an experimental gift-exchange environment to explore two related questions using both managers and undergraduates as subjects. First, do workers reciprocate sick pay in the same way as they reciprocate wage payments?...

Sick pay is a common provision in most labor contracts. This paper employs an experimental gift-exchange environment to explore two related questions using both managers and undergraduates as subjects. First, do workers reciprocate sick pay in the same way as they reciprocate wage payments?...

Sick-pay is a common provision in labor contracts. It insures workers against a sudden loss of income due to unexpected absences and helps them smooth consumption. Therefore, many governments find sick-pay socially desirable and choose to mandate its provision. But sick-pay is not without its...

In a punishment experiment, we separate the demand for punishmentin general from a possible demand to conduct punishmentpersonally. Subjects experience an unfair split of their earnings froma real effort task and have to decide on the punishment of the personwho determines the distribution....

Two rationality arguments are used to justify the link between condi-tional and unconditional preferences in decision theory: dynamic consistencyand consequentialism. Dynamic consistency requires that ex ante contingentchoices are respected by updated preferences. Consequentialism states...

This paper experimentally investigates whether risk-averseindividuals punish less if the outcome of punishment is uncertain thanwhen it is certain. Our design includes three treatments: Baseline inwhich the one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game is played; CertainPunishment in which the prisoner’s...