In moral hazard models, bank shareholders have incentives to transfer wealth from the deposit insurer--that is, maximize put option value--by pursuing riskier strategies. For safe banks with large charter value, however, the risk-taking incentive is outweighed by the possibility of losing...

In moral hazard models, bank shareholders have incentives to transfer wealth from the deposit insurer - that is, maximize put option value - by pursuing riskier strategies. For safe banks with large charter value, however, the risk-taking incentive is outweighed by the possibility of losing...

The current review of the 1988 Basel Capital Accord has put the spotlight on the ratios used to assess banks’ capital adequacy. This article examines the effectiveness of three capital ratios—the first based on leverage, the second on gross revenues, and the third on risk-weighted...

This paper tests for the presence of depositor discipline by examining the effect of depository institutions' risk on the pricing and growth of uninsured deposits. The study analyzes a large panel of thrifts that includes detailed information on interest rate schedules. This information allows...

[...]We focus here on three types of capital ratios—riskweighted,leverage, and gross revenue ratios. For each ratio, weexamine what makes it actually or potentially useful for bankregulation and we ask whether it is indeed significantly relatedto subsequent bank failure. Perhaps not...

In moral hazard models, bank shareholders have incentives to transfer wealth from the deposit insurer - that is, maximize put option value - by pursuing riskier strategies. For safe banks with large charter value, however, the risk-taking incentive is outweighed by the possibility of losing...