We investigate the impact of differences in privatisation method on national economic performance in transition economies. Our approach is to estimate, using dynamic panel data methods, a growth equation over 23 countries for the period 1990-2001. Among our results, we find that mass...

We model entry by entrepreneurs into new markets in developing economies with regulatory barriers in the form of licence fees and bureaucratic delay. Because laissez faire leads to 'excessive' entry, a licence fee can increase welfare by discouraging entry. However, in the presence of a licence...

We address the impact of corruption in a developing economy in the context of an empirically relevant hold-up problem - when a foreign firm sinks an investment to provide infrastructure services. We focus on the structure of the economy's bureaucracy, which can be centralized or decentralized,...

We model decisions with respect to formality or informality for entrepreneurs in a new industry for a developing economy. We show that informality allows a leader to explore, without significant sunk costs, the potential profitability of the industry; that is, informality may be a stepping...

An industry is modeled in which entrepreneurs, who are heterogeneous in ability, may produce formally or informally. It is shown how the formal-informal mix depends on the distribution of ability, product demand and various parameter values. The industry equilibrium is compared to one in which...

We analyse potential dynamic benefits for a firm from having the option of adopting informal status. Informality may be a stepping stone, without which formality might never be achieved. This result obtains for a broad range of realistic parameter values, suggesting a potential dynamic case for...

For two different regulatory standards, we examine the optimal minimum wage in a competitive labour market when the government is uncertain about supply and demand. Solutions are related to underlying supply and demand conditions, and the extent of uncertainty and of rationing efficiency. We...

In many transition economies, insiders controlled state-owned firms, de facto. For such firms, we model the decision about privatization method, focusing on the choice between free distribution (so called 'mass privatization') and management-employee buyouts. We incorporate a political...

We model entry by entrepreneurs into new markets in developing economies with regulatory barriers in the form of licence fees and bureaucratic delay. Because laissez faire leads to 'excessive' entry, a licence fee can increase welfare by discouraging entry. However, in the presence of a licence...

In many transition economies, insiders controlled state-owned firms, de facto. For such firms, we model the decision about privatization method, focusing on the choice between free distribution (so called 'mass privatization') and management-employee buyouts. We incorporate a political...