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Traditional game theory usually relies on commonly known decision rationality meaning that choices are made in view of their consequences (the shadow of the future). Evolutionary game theory, however, denies any cognitive deliberation by assuming that choice behavior evolves due to its past...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010296333
In the experimental scenario several agents repeatedly invest in n (n2) state-specific assets. The evolutionarily stable and equilibrium (Blume and Easley, 1992) portfolio for this situation requires to distribute funds according to the constant probabilities of the various states. The different...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274010
Standard economic explanations of good conduct in trade rely almostexclusively on future-directed extrinsic motivations induced by materialincentives. But intrinsic motives to behave trustworthy and to punishuntrustworthiness do support trade. In our model, intrinsically motivatedplayers are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866698
If the (un)trustworthy are rare, people will talk about them, making their detectionmore reliable and / or less costly. When, however, both types appear in large numbers,detecting (un)trustworthiness will be considerably more difficult and possibly too costly.Based on Güth and Kliemt (2000) we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866717
Applying an evolutionary framework, we investigate how a reputation mechanism and abuyer insurance (as used on Internet market platforms such as eBay) interact to promote trustworthinessand trust. Our analysis suggests that the costs involved in giving reliable feedbackdetermine the gains from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866721
The main results of our indirect evolutionary approach to trust in large interactions suggest that trsutworthiness must be detectable if good conduct in trust-relationships is to survive. According to theoretical reasoning there is a niche then for an organization offering a possibly costly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866811
Traditional game theory usually relies on commonly known decision rationality meaning that choices are made in view of their consequences (the shadow of the future). Evolutionary game theory, however, denies any cognitive deliberation by assuming that choice behavior evolves due to its past...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866852
To commit credibly in bargaining is crucial: In the ultimatum game with its one–sided early commitment power the “proposer” gets (nearly) the whole pie while the“responder” is left with (almost) nothing. When both parties commit simultaneouslythe (a)symmetric Nash(1950)–bargaining...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866908
On an otherwise symmetric oligopoly market with stochastic demands for heterogeneousproducts firms can either hire an employee or partner or buy therequired labor input on the labor market. Whereas the wage of hired labor doesnot depend on the realization of stochastic demand, the price of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005867008
This paper focuses on the uneasy alliance of rational choice and evolutionary explanations in modern economics. While direct evolutionary explanations of "optimality" rule out "purposeful" rational choice by assuming zero-intelligence and pure rational choice explanations leave no room for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005867034