Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 37
Cover Image
The role assignment model nearly fits most social networks
Pekec, Aleksandar; Roberts, Fred S. - In: Mathematical Social Sciences 41 (2001) 3, pp. 275-293
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005364763
Cover Image
Scheduling Periodic Jobs Compactly Within a Fixed Time Period in Open Shops
Werra, D.De; Mahadev, N.V.R.; Solot, Ph - In: INFOR : information systems and operational research 32 (1994) 2, pp. 110
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10006343863
Cover Image
Characterizations of the plurality function
Roberts, Fred S. - In: Mathematical social sciences 21 (1991) 2, pp. 101-127
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001112054
Cover Image
What if utility functions do not exist?
Roberts, Fred S. - In: Theory and decision : an international journal for … 3 (1972/73), pp. 126-139
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002692932
Cover Image
Limitations on conclusions using scales of measurement
Roberts, Fred S. - In: Operations research and the public sector, (pp. 621-671). 1994
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001315901
Cover Image
Computer science and decision theory
Roberts, Fred S. - 2008
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003764827
Cover Image
Discrete mathematical models : with applications to social, biological, and environmental problems
Roberts, Fred S. - 1976
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004675537
Cover Image
From football to oil rigs : risk assessment for combined cyber and physical attacks
Roberts, Fred S. - In: Journal of benefit-cost analysis : JBCA 10 (2019) 2, pp. 251-273
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012194748
Cover Image
Sequential vs. Single-Round Uniform-Price Auctions
Mezzetti, Claudio; Pekec, Aleksandar; Tsetlin, Ilia - 2004
We study sequential and single-round uniform-price auctions with affiliated values. We derive symmetric equilibrium for the auction in which k1 objects are sold in the first round and k2 in the second round, with and without revelation of the first-round winning bids. We demonstrate that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325021
Cover Image
Sequential vs. Single-Round Uniform-Price Auctions
Mezzetti, Claudio; Pekec, Aleksandar; Tsetlin, Ilia - Department of Economics, Leicester University - 2005
We study sequential and single-round uniform-price auctions with affiliated values. We derive symmetric equilibrium for the auction in which k1 objects are sold in the first round and k2 in the second round, with and without revelation of the first-round winning bids. We demonstrate that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005561919