Law firms are expected to be controlled by the workers because given the diffculty of monitoring labor, the transaction cost would be very high and the essential human capital investment would be lacking in a firm controlled by the capital suppliers. Expectations are confirmed by the data....

We model the organizational choice of a small firm given formal and informal credit market parameters. We observe a positive relationship between the size of the informal sector and the spread across countries. We take spread as relative inefficiency of the formal credit markets. Furthermore we...

Law firms are expected to be controlled by the workers because given the diffculty of monitoring labor, the transaction cost would be very high and the essential human capital investment would be lacking in a firm controlled by the capital suppliers. Expectations are confirmed by the data....

We model the organizational choice of a small firm given formal and informal credit market parameters. We observe a positive relationship between the size of the informal sector and the spread across countries. We take spread as relative inefficiency of the formal credit markets. Furthermore we...