This paper analyzes the independence of boards of directors as an optimally chosen, non-contractible behavior. A board behaves loyally to a CEO when it agrees to a negative NPV-pro ject, giving the CEO private benefits. While the CEO benefitsfrom competent directors because they help him make...

An agent shows loyalty to his manager by bearing personal costs to the superiors benefit. In return, the manager may offer various forms of rewards. If this exchange is not contractible, typically repeated interaction will be required to sustain it. Beyond loyalty, the manager is interested in...

Recent organizational theories suggest that there is a tradeoff between loyalty and competence. This paper tests several such theories in the context of public agencies. Prime ministers, chancellors, and kings alike need to secure the (efficient or inefficient) loyalty of their agencies, such as...

In recent years, tradeable permits (TP) have become widespread in use. One noteworthy point is that the international experience is rather small. Europe has only relatively recently begun to develop such programs. There is a wealth of resources available that comment on the rise of these...

This paper analyzes the expected life-time utility and the hedging demands in an exchange only, representative agent general equilibrium under incomplete information. We derive an expression for the investor’s expected life-time utility, and analyze his hedging demands for intertemporal changes...

This paper investigates the extent to which differences in information costs can explain the equity home bias puzzle. In a model where the cost of acquiring information regarding the Foreign asset is higher than for the Home asset, we show that–if cost functions are convex–the expected size of...

This paper analyzes the term structure of interest rates in an exchange-only Lucas (1978) economy where consumers learn about a stochastic growth rate through observations of the endowment process and an external public signal. We allow for deluded consumers, who exaggerate the degree of...

We show that a simple equilibrium model with uncertain growth is able to simultaneously generate patterns in implied volatility and risk aversion that are similar to the ones observed in the data. In addition, the model produces an implied pricing kernel that is increasing for particular levels...

We show in a theoretical model that the expected excess return on any asset depends on its covariance not only with the market portfolio, but also with changes in the representative agents estimate. We test our model by using GMM and compare it to the Fama-French model. The results suggest that...

Three types of agents acting on different information sets are considered: fully informed agents, insiders, and outsiders. Differences in information quality are shown to affect the properties of their optimal portfolios. For an outsider, the share of wealth invested in the stock is decreasing...