This dissertation examines the reasons for which a seller may decide to conduct a multi-unit auction sequentially rather than simultaneously. It analyzes the manner in which the information generated during a sequential auction can affect bidding to the seller's benefit and demonstrates the...

This work is composed of three essays on auction theory. In the first essay, we analyze the optimal auction of multiple non-identical objects when buyers are risk averse. We show that the auction forms that yield the maximum revenue in the risk neutral case are no longer optimal. In particular,...

Informational assumptions are an important aspect of the study of auctions in economictheory. However, there has been limited research into how the assumptions made by theoristsimpact their results. I explore two different aspects of the information available to biddersin auctions. The...

The static matching models have been applied to real-life markets such as hospital intern markets, school choice for public schools, kidney exchange for patients, and on-campus housing for college students. However, these markets inherently involve dynamic aspects. This dissertation introduces...