The paper presents a model of student migration in order to determine the optimal choice of non-resident tuition fees in a host country of higher education. Students with rational expectations consider a potential return migration in their first-round decision whether to study abroad, so that...

This paper presents a model of two countries competing for a pool of students from the rest of the world (ROW). In equilibrium, one country offers high educational quality for high tuition fees, while the other country provides a low quality and charges low fees. The quality in the high quality...

The paper presents a model of student migration in order to determine the optimal choice of non-resident tuition fees in a host country of higher education. Students with rational expectations consider a potential return migration in their first-round decision whether to study abroad, so that...

The paper presents a model of two countries competing for the international pool of talented students from the rest of the world. To relax tuition-fee competition, countries differentiate their education systems in equilibrium. While one country offers high education quality at high charges for...

This paper presents a model of two countries competing for a pool of students from the rest of the world (ROW). In equilibrium, one country offers high educational quality for high tuition fees, while the other country provides a low quality and charges low fees. The quality in the high quality...