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Strong activity rules for iterative combinatorial auctions

Harsha, Pavithra; Barnhart, Cynthia; Parkes, David C.; … - In: Computers & operations research : and their … 37 (2010) 7, pp. 1271-1284

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003945045

Sharing online advertising revenue with consumers

Chen, Yiling; Ghosh, Arpita; McAfee, Randolph Preston; … - In: Internet and network economics : 4th international …, (pp. 556-565). 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003792845

Bluffing and strategic reticence in prediction markets

Chen, Yiling; Reeves, Daniel M.; Pennock, David M.; … - In: Internet and network economics : third international …, (pp. 70-81). 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003648609

Expressiveness and robustness of first-price position auctions

Dütting, Paul; Fischer, Felix; Parkes, David C. - In: Mathematics of operations research 44 (2019) 1, pp. 196-211

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012001087

Auctions, bidding and exchange design

Kalagnanam, Jayant; Parkes, David C. - In: Handbook of quantitative supply chain analysis : …, (pp. 143-212). 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002233775

Multi-item Vickrey : Dutch auctions

Mishra, Debasis; Parkes, David C. - In: Games and economic behavior 66 (2009) 1, pp. 326-347

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003852754

Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations

Mishra, Debasis (contributor); Parkes, David C. (contributor) - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003289443

Testing a purportedly more learnable auction mechanism

Milkman, Katherine L.; Burns, James; Parkes, David C.; … - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003722751

Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations

Mishra, Debasis; Parkes, David C. - In: Journal of economic theory 132 (2007) 1, pp. 335-366

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003407404

Testing a Purportedly More Learnable Auction Mechanism

Milkman, Katherine L.; Barron, Gregory M.; Burns, James; … - 2012

We describe an auction mechanism in the class of Groves mechanisms that has received attention in the computer science literature because of its theoretical property of being more "learnable" than the standard second price auction mechanism. We bring this mechanism, which we refer to as the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014047849