In unrestricted combinatorial auctions, we put forward a mechanism that guarantees a meaningful revenue benchmark based on the possibilistic beliefs that the players have about each other’s valuations. In essence, the mechanism guarantees, within a factor of two, the maximum revenue that the...

Three related trends in world politics – shifting in power relations, increased diversity of actors and entities, and the growing mobilization and politicization of global constituencies are contributing to a global “tussle” which threatens to erupt in a full-fledged international...

Privacy and trust affect our strategic thinking, yet have not been precisely modeled in mechanism design. In settings of incomplete information, traditional implementations of a normal-form mechanism--by disregarding the players' privacy, or assuming trust in a mediator--may fail to reach the...

Privacy and trust aect our strategic thinking, yet they have not been precisely modeled in mechanism design. In settings of incomplete information, traditional implementations of a normal-form mechanism - by disregarding the players' privacy, or assuming trust in a mediator - may fail to reach...

Privacy and trust affect our everyday thinking and, in particular, the way we approach a concrete game. Accordingly, we hope that a rigorous treatment of privacy and trust will become integral part of mechanism design. As of now, the field has been very successful in finding many ingenious...

Collecting and processing large amounts of data is becoming increasingly crucialin our society. We model this task as evaluating a function f over a large vector x =(x1,...,xn), which is unknown, but drawn from a publicly known distribution X. In our model, learning each component of the input x...