Elections sometimes give policy makers incentives to pander, i.e., to implement a policy that voters think is in their best interest, even though the policy maker knows that a different policy is actually better for the voters. Pandering incentives are typically attenuated when voters learn,...

We identify an exogenous source of variation in exposure to campaign advertising in the 2000 presidential election, based on residence in battleground states. If exposure to campaign advertising makes a potential voter significantly more likely to vote, then we should see significantly greater...

We study a model of party formation in which the informativeness of party labels and inter-party ideological heterogeneity are endogenously and jointly determined in response to electoral incentives. Parties use screening to increase the cost of affiliation for politicians whose ideal points...

I study a model of repeated elections with both symmetric learning about candidate ability and moral hazard. In this model, candidates choose how to allocate their resources between constituency service and policy work. Early in their careers, they devote excessive time to constituency service...

We study a game in which candidates first choose platforms and then invest in costly valences (e.g., engage in campaign spending). The marginal return to valence depends on platform polarization--the closer platforms are, the more valence affects the election outcome. Consequently, candidates...