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We examine the tradeoffs between two variants of group strategyproofness, efficiency and budget balance in queueing models. In general, group strategyproofness is incompatible with efficiency and budget balance. Weakening budget balance to feasibility, we show that the incompatibility persists...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005826985
We identify and characterize a natural and intuitive class of mechanisms called the k-pivotal mechanisms. The axioms used are efficiency, pairwise strategyproofness, equal treatment of equals and weak linearity. We also identify the subclass of these mechanisms which do not run a budget deficit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008914625
We investigate the implications of egalitarian equivalence (Pazner and Schmeidler in Q J Econ 92:671–687, <CitationRef CitationID="CR31">1978</CitationRef>) together with queue efficiency and strategyproofness in the context of queueing problems. We completely characterize the class of mechanisms satisfying the three requirements. Though...</citationref>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010993550
We characterize all anonymous VCG mechanisms by using queue efficiency, strategyproofness and equal treatment of equals. By additionally imposing independence axioms, introduced by Chun (2006a) and Maniquet (2003), we characterize the pivotal and the reward-based pivotal mechanisms in the class...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117956
We investigate the problem of reordering agents starting from an existing queue. First, we introduce four important axioms of the problem, budget balance (BB), outcome efficiency (OE), strategyproofness (SP), and individual rationality (IR). Unfortunately, it is easy to show that these four...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010681413
We investigate the implications of egalitarian equivalence (Pazner and Schmeidler [22]) together with queue efficiency and strategyproofness in the context of queueing problems. We completely characterize the class of mechanisms satisfying the three requirements. Though there is no mechanism in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010681414
We identify a sufficient class of coalitional form games with transferable utility for which prenucleolus coincides with the Shapley value. We then apply our result to simple games and to generalized queueing games.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005611831
We extend the literature on the coincidence of the prenucleolus and the Shapley value, by identifying a class of coalitional form games called PS games. We analyse the role of PS games in the context of queueing problems, and show that in the class of generalized queueing games only those...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005175270
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012063738
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