We consider situations where legal liability yields insufficient incentives for socially efficient behavior, e.g., individuals who cause harm are not always sued or are unable to pay fully for harm done. Some individuals nevertheless behave efficiently because of intrinsic prosocial concerns....

We incorporate normative motivations into the unilateral precaution model of tort. Individuals have moral concerns about causing harm and would like others to believe that they do. In the absence of legal liability, causing harm suggests low concerns and is therefore damaging to one's social...

We debate the contribution of the economic analysis of legal procedures, with a special regard for the debate between inquisitorial and accusatory systems and the judge?s role in the course of the procedure. The article proposes a presentation of the literature and develops specific models...

We incorporate normative motivations into the economic model of accidents and tort rules. The social norm is that one should avoid harming others and should compensate if nevertheless harm is caused. To some extent, this is internalized through intrinsic moral concerns; moreover, those thought...

We analyze the complementarity between legal incentives (the threat of being held liable for damages) and normative incentives (the fear of social disapproval or stigma) in situations where instances of misbehavior are not perfectly observable. There may be multiple equilibria within a given...