In this paper I contrast the impact of precision, i.e., the level of accuracy with which workers' performance is assessed, on wage costs in U- and J-type tournaments. In U-type tournaments prizes are fixed. In J-type tournaments only anoverall wage sum is specified. The principal can increase...

We analyze the optimal combination of promotion tournaments and individual performance pay in an employment relationship. An agents effort is non-observable and he has private information about his suitability for promotion. Thus, promo-tion tournaments and individual performance pay need to be...

I compare an auction and a tournament in a procurement setting where a noncontractible signal about the quality that each firm is able to supply is observed by the procurer and all competing firms. Signals are affected by firms noncontractibleinvestments in R&D and the procurers precision of...

In this paper I contrast the impact of precision, i.e., the level of accuracy with which workers’ performance is assessed, on wage costs in U- and J-type tournaments. In U-type tournaments prizes are fixed. In J-type tournaments only an overall wage sum is specified. The principal can increase...

We show that establishing an internal labor market by offering combined contracts across hierarchy levels strictly dominates external recruitment when workers are homogeneous. The reason is that only an internal labor market can exploit higher tier rents for incentive provision on lower tiers....