This paper contributes to the analysis of central vs. decentral (firm-level) labour market negotiations. We argue that during negotiations on a central scale employers and employees plausibly take output market effects into account, while they behave competitively during firm-level negotiations....

We explore the Alchian–Allen effect–that is, the effect of an absolutely equal increase in the price of two goods on their demand ratio–for conditional (viz. short-run) and unconditional (viz. long-run) demand functions. We show that the Alchian–Allen effect for unconditional demand...

We investigate the influence of social approval, reputation, and individual characteristics on voting behavior in the German version of the TV show “Come Dine With Me”. Five contestants prepare a dinner for each other during the course of a week and evaluate each other’s performance. The...

In this paper we investigate optimal harvesting of a renewable natural resource. While in the standard approach the resource is located at a single point in space we allow for the resource to be distributed over the plane. Consequently, an agent who exploits the resource has to travel from one...

type="main" xml:lang="en" <title type="main">Abstract</title> <p>Applying a framework of perfect competition under uncertainty, we contribute to the discussion of whether or not ad valorem taxes and specific taxes are equivalent. While this equivalence holds without price uncertainty, we show that ad valorem taxes and...</p>

We interpret the TV-show Come Dine with Me as a simultaneous non-cooperative game with evaluation levels as strategic variables, and show that it belongs to a class of strategic games which we label mutual evaluations games (MEG). Any MEG possesses a ‘zero equilibrium’—i. e. a Nash...

Applying a framework of perfect competition under uncertainty, we contribute to the discussion of whether or not ad valorem taxes and specific taxes are equivalent. While this equivalence holds without price uncertainty, we show that ad valorem taxes and specific taxes are “almost never”...

Applying a framework of perfect competition under uncertainty, we contribute to the discussion of whether or not ad valorem taxes and specific taxes are equivalent. While this equivalence holds without price uncertainty, we show that ad valorem taxes and specific taxes are “almost never”...

We extend the classical tax-competition framework of Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) by modeling involuntary unemployment and by allowing for labor taxation as a second source of public funds. Even though the framework of the Zodrow-Mieszkowski model is extended into two dimensions, we are able to...

We apply a model with two types of labour where each group decides on whether it prefers to be represented by an independent craft-specific labour union or by a joint union. Applying the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution, we find that it is beneficial for at least one group of labourers to...