This article reports the results of a simple bargaining experiment on the ultimatum-revenge game. The game enables to differentiate between fairness that is stimulated by intentional based motives, distributional motives, and fairness considerations that mix both motives. The laboratory...

Carpenter and Matthews (2009) examine the cooperation norms determining people's punishment behavior in a social-dilemma game. Their findings are striking: absolute norms outperform the relative norms commonly regarded as the determinants of punishment. Using multiple punishment stages and...

Carpenter and Matthews (2009) examine the cooperation norms determining people's punishment behavior in a social-dilemma game. Their findings are striking: absolute norms outperform the relative norms commonly regarded as the determinants of punishment. Using multiple punishment stages and...

We analyze the interplay between cooperation norms and people's punishment behavior in a social-dilemma game with multiple punishment stages. By combining multiple punishment stages with self- contained episodes of interaction, we are able to disentangle the e ects of retaliation and...

In an experimental setting, firms in a duopoly market engage in a patent tournamentand compete for profit-enhancing product advancements. The firms generateincome by matching exogenously defined demand preferences with an appropriatelycomposed product portfolio of their own. Demand preferences...

This study investigates the dynamic efficiency of an emissionregulation regime where companies competitively pay for emissionlicences. We embed the emission licence market in a Cournotmodel where the price of emission licences is subject to strategictradeoff between licences and abatement...