A model of a market with pairwise meetings is developed in which traders have asymmetric information about the true state of the world. The focus is on information transmission. The main questions concern the extent to which the information is revealed to uninformed agents through the trade...

We show that in a class of I‐agent mechanism design problems with evidence, commitment is unnecessary, randomization has no value, and robust incentive compatibility has no cost. In particular, for each agent i, we construct a simple disclosure game between the...

An important application of the theory of choice under uncertainty is to asset markets, and an important property in these markets is a preference for portfolio diversification. If an investor is an expected utility maximizer, then he is risk averse if, and only if, he exhibits a preference for...

This paper develops a decision-theoretic approach to normal-form refinements of Nash equilibrium and provides characterizations of (normal-form) perfect equilibrium and proper equilibrium. The approach relies on a theory of single-person decision-making that is a non-Archimedean version of...

Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (2001) (henceforth DLR) axiomatically characterized three representations of preferences that allow for a desire for flexibility and/or commitment. In one of these representations (ordinal expected utility), the independence axiom is stated in a weaker form than is...