We present attractiveness, a re…nement criterion for evolutionary equilibria. Equilibria surviving this criterion are robust to small perturbations of the underlying payoff system or the dynamics at hand. Furthermore, certain attractive equilibria are equivalent to others for certain...

We introduce a new kind of projection dynamics by employing a ray-projection both locally and globally. By global (local) we mean a projection of a vector (close to the unit simplex) unto the unit simplex along a ray through the origin. Using a correspondence between local and global...

Agents interacting on a body of water choose between technologies to catch …fish. One is harmless to the resource, as it allows full recovery; the other yields high immediate catches, but low(er) future catches.… Strategic interaction in one 'objective' resource game may induce………………...

We introduce a stochastic game in which transition probabilities depend on the history of the play, i.e., the players’ past action choices. To solve this new type of game under the limiting average reward criterion, we determine the set of jointly-convergent pure-strategy rewards which can be...

We present two new notions of evolutionary stability, the truly evolutionarily stable state (TESS) and the generalized evolutionarily stable equilibrium (GESE). The GESE generalizes the evolutionarily stable equilibrium (ESE) of Joosten [1996]. An ESE attracts all nearby trajectories...

In a Small Fish War two agents interacting on a body of water have essentially two options: they can …fish with restraint or without. Fishing with restraint is not harmful; …shing without yields a higher immediate catch, but may induce lower future catches. Inspired by recent work in biology,...

To analyze strategic interaction which may induce externalities, we designed Bathroom Games with frequency-dependent stage payoffs. Two people regularly use a bathroom, before leaving they can either clean up the mess made, or not. Cleaning up involves an effort, so this option always gives a...

We model and analyze strategic interaction over time in a duopolis-tic market. Each period the firms independently and simultaneously choose whether to advertise or not. Advertising increases the own immediate sales, but may also cause an externality, e.g., increase or decrease the immediate...