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We consider the hold-up problem between a foreign direct investor and the government(s) in a host country with weak governmental structure and lack of power to commit. Using Nash threats, we show that an efficient investment level can be sustained for a sufficiently high discount factor and ask...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010307038
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10006604608
We consider the hold-up problem between a foreign direct investor and the government(s) in a host country with weak governmental structure and lack of power to commit. Using Nash threats, we show that an efficient investment level can be sustained for a sufficiently high discount factor and ask...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009367927
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008210721
We consider the hold-up problem between a foreign direct investor and the government(s) in a host country with weak governmental structure and lack of power to commit. Using Nash threats, we show that an efficient investment level can be sustained for a sufficiently high discount factor and ask...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014060654
"Both in the developed and developing world, decentralization of fiscal policy is frequently argued to foster investment, because allowing investors to choose between competing locations should make it difficult for each jurisdiction to tax the investment's returns. We point out that this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005679738
This paper shows that vertical fiscal inefficiencies impede federally organized countries in successfully attracting foreign direct investment. Such countries, particularly if characterized by weak institutions, are disadvantaged in the process of bidding for firms and in their ability to commit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011096161
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005394951