In this paper we use a dynamic structural life-cycle model to analyze the employment,fiscal and welfare effects induced by unemployment insurance. The model features a detailedspecification of the tax and transfer system, including unemployment insurance benefitswhich depend on an individual's...

In this paper we develop a dynamic structural life-cycle model of labor supplybehavior which fully accounts for the eects of income tax and transfers on la-bor supply incentives. Additionally, the model recognizes the demand side drivenrationing risk that might prevent individuals from realizing...

This paper considers the problem of determining the extent of any state dependen-cies in women's labor supply behavior. Employment outcomes are modeled using adynamic multinomial choice framework including persistent unobserved heterogeneitywith a relatively general distribution. In order to...

We empirically analyze the optimal mix and optimal generosity of unemployment insurance and social assistance programs. To do so, we specify a structural life-cycle model of the labor supply, savings, and social assistance claiming decisions of singles and married couples. Partial insurance...

We analyze empirically the optimal design of social insurance and assistance programs when families obtain insurance by making labor supply choices for both spouses. For this purpose, we specify a structural life-cycle model of the labor supply and savings decisions of singles and married...

We analyze empirically the optimal design of social insurance and assistance programs when families obtain insurance by making labor supply choices for both spouses. For this purpose, we specify a structural life-cycle model of the labor supply and savings decisions of singles and married...

We analyze empirically the optimal design of social insurance and assistance programs when families obtain insurance by making labor supply choices for both spouses. For this purpose, we specify a structural life-cycle model of the labor supply and savings decisions of singles and married...

We analyze empirically the optimal design of social insurance and assistance programs when families obtain insurance by making labor supply choices for both spouses. For this purpose, we specify a structural life-cycle model of the labor supply and savings decisions of singles and married...

We empirically analyze the heterogeneous welfare effects of unemployment insurance and social assistance. We estimate a structural life-cycle model of singles' and married couples' labor supply and savings decisions. The model includes heterogeneity by age, education, wealth, sex and household...