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Gordon Tullock : a Nobel Prize left unbestowed

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Additive multi-effort contests with multiple investment opportunities

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Production and conflict models versus rent-seeking models

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On the inappropriateness of collective rent seeking analysis when agents exert within-group and between-group efforts

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The ratio of within-group to between-group fighting is shown to be unrealistically high for the collective rent seeking model when agents exert two efforts i.e. within-group and between-group efforts. The ratio is more realistic for the production and conflict model. Six economics examples...

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