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To understand how the welfare state adjusts to economic shocks it is important to explain both the genesis of popular preferences and the institutional incentives of governments to respond to these preferences. This paper attempts to do both, using a general theoretical framework and detailed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010307102
Die gängige Begründung – basierend auf der bahnbrechenden Arbeit Rokkans – dafür, dass ein spezifisches Wahlsystem bevorzugt wird, ist, dass die Verhältniswahl („proportional respresentation“ oder „PR“) von einer zersplitterten Rechte eingeführt wurde, um ihre Klasseninteressen...
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To comprehend how the welfare state adjusts to economic shocks it is important to get a handle on both the genesis of popular preferences and the institutional incentives for governments to respond to these preferences. This paper attempts to do both, using a general theoretical framework and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012716908
An influential line of argument holds that trade exposure causes economic uncertainty and spurs popular demands for compensatory and risk-sharing welfare state spending. The argument has gained renewed prominence through the recent work of Garrett (1998) and Rodrik (1997; 1998). This paper argues...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009353704
To understand how the welfare state adjusts to economic shocks it is important to explain both the genesis of popular preferences and the institutional incentives of governments to respond to these preferences. This paper attempts to do both, using a general theoretical framework and detailed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009367947