We provide a new characterization of implementability of reduced form mechanisms in terms of straightforward second-order stochastic dominance. In addition, we present a simple proof of Matthews’ (1984) conjecture, proved by Border (1991), on implementability.

We provide several generalizations of the various equilibrium existence results in Reny (1999), Barelli and Meneghel (2013), and McLennan, Monteiro, and Tourky (2011). We also provide an example demonstrating that a natural additional generalization is not possible. All of the theorems yielding...

An infinite game is approximated by restricting the players to finite subsets of their pure strategy spaces. A strategic approximation of an infinite game is a countable subset of pure strategies with the property that limits of all equilibria of all sequences of approximating games whose finite...

We generalize Athey's (2001) and McAdams' (2003) results on the existence of monotone pure strategy equilibria in Bayesian games. We allow action spaces to be compact locally-complete metrizable semilattices and type spaces to be partially ordered probability spaces. Our proof is based upon...

We provide general conditions under which principal-agent problems admit mechanisms that are optimal for the principal. Our result covers as special cases those in which the agent has no private information –i.e., pure moral hazard –as well as those in which the agent’s only action...

For an arbitrary finite or infinite dataset D of prices and corresponding chosen bundles, it is shown that the following three conditions are equivalent. (i) D satisfies GARP; (ii) D can be rationalized by a utility function; (iii) D can be rationalized by a strictly increasing, quasiconcave...