The purpose of this paper is to study the kind of efficient allocations that can be achieved in exchange economies with asymmetric information, by means of a decentralized mechanism robust to coalitional, strategic deviations. To this end, we define a new strategic equilibrium concept - called...

Building on Giraud & Tsomocos (2009), we develop a model of non equilibrium international trades with incomplete markets. Trades occur in continuous time, both on international and domestic markets. Traders are assumed to exhibit locally rational expectations on future prices, interest rates and...

Building on Giraud & Tsomocos (2009), we develop a model of non equilibrium international trades with incomplete markets. Trades occur in continuous time, both on international and domestic markets. Traders are assumed to exhibit locally rational expectations on future prices, interest rates and...

We define a newstrategic equilibrium concept - called strong collusion-proof contract - designed to characterize stable communication agreements in games with differential information against non-binding, selfenforcing and incentive compatible deviations by coalitions. We then construct a...

We present a feasible strategic market mechanism with finitely many agents whose Nash, semi-strong Nash and coalition-proof Nash equilibria fully implement the Walrasian equilibria. We define a strategic equilibrium concept, called correlated semi-strong equilibrium, and show that the Walrasian...

The purpose of this paper is to study the kind of efficient allocations that can be achieved in exchange economies with asymmetric information, by means of a decentralized mechanism robust to coalitional, strategic deviations. To this end, we define a new strategic equilibrium concept – called...