Using an analytically solvable equilibrium model, we study how the distribution of economic activities is affected by the trade-off between pecuniary externalities, as dependent on transportation costs, and localized technological externalities, as dependent on inter-regional spillovers. We...

Using an analytically solvable equilibrium model, we study how the distribution of economic activities is affected by the trade-off between pecuniary externalities, as dependent on transportation costs, and localized technological externalities, as dependent on inter-regional spillovers. We...

Are the observed spatial distributions of firms decided mostly by market-mediated, economy-wide locational forces, or rather by non-pecuniary, sector-specific ones? This work finds that the latter kind of forces weight systematically more than the former in deciding firm location. The analysis...

This work explores the spatial distribution of productive activities in the Italian manufacturing industry. We propose an econometric model which tries to disentangle locationspecific from sectoral drivers in the dynamic process of spatial agglomeration. The basic idea is that the former...

Economies of agglomeration are central in understanding the emergence of industrial clustering. However, existing models that incorporate economies of agglomeration to explain industrial concentration have been providing a quite small set of empirically testable predictions. In this paper, we...

Economies of agglomeration are central in understanding the emergence of industrial clustering. However, existing models that incorporate economies of agglomeration to explain industrial concentration have been providing a quite small set of empirically testable predictions. In this paper, we...

We consider an economy in which a heterogeneous population of agents have to choose among a common set of alternatives. The utilities associated to the different alternatives posses a common component and an individual component, which reflect differences in the underlying structure of agents...