We introduce a game-theoretic model with switching costs and endogenous references. An agent endogenizes his reference strategy and then, taking switching costs into account, he selects a strategy from which there is no profitable deviation. We axiomatically characterize this selection procedure...

In a list, alternatives appear according to an order and the decision maker follows this order to evaluate alternatives. He records the first alternative as the initial survivor and then at every stage, he compares the current survivor with the next alternative in the list to determine whether...

When consumers are not fully cognizant of the value of a good, they use their experience to estimate its value. Their past experience is selective if it only contains transactions that were carried out but not potential transactions that were not implemented. Failing to account for this...

This paper characterizes the optimal information structure in competitive insurance markets with adverse selection. A regulator assigns ratings to individuals according to their risk characteristics, insurers offer fixed insurance contracts to each rating group, and the market clears as in...

This paper characterizes the optimal information structure in competitive insurance markets with adverse selection. A regulator assigns ratings to individuals according to their risk characteristics, insurers offer fixed insurance contracts to each rating group, and the market clears as in...