Worker heterogeneity in productivity and labor supply is introduced into a matching model. Workers who earn high wages and work high-hours are identified as those with strong market comparative advantage—high rents from being employed. The model is calibrated to match separation, job finding,...

We model worker heterogeneity in the rents from being employed in a Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model of matching and unemployment. We show that heterogeneity, reflecting differences in match quality and worker assets, reduces the extent of fluctuations in separations and unemployment. We find...

and less cyclical unemployment duration. We examine these predictions for workers in the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP).

We consider a matching model of employment with wages that are flexible for new hires, but sticky within matches. We depart from standard treatments of sticky wages by allowing worker effort to respond to the wage being too high or low, rendering the effective wage (wage divided by output) more...

Separations are noticeably more countercyclical for workers who average shorter workweeks. This pattern is mirrored in wage cyclicality; wages are less procyclical for those who work shorter hours. But separations, counter to our model predictions, are not higher in recessions nor heavily...

We examine the response of a sticky-wage economy to various real and nominal shocks. In addition to variations in hours, we allow for an endogenous response in worker effort per hour. Despite wages being predetermined, the labor market clears through the effort margin. We find that the ability...

We examine the impact of wage stickiness when employment has an effort as well as hours dimension. Despite wages being predetermined, the labor market clears through the effort margin. Consequently, welfare costs of wage stickiness are potentially much, much smaller.