Theories in political economy depend critically on assumptions about motivations of politicians. Our analysis starts from the premise that politicians, like other economic agents, are rational individuals who make career decisions by comparing the expected returns of alternative choices. The...

This paper discusses institutional reforms that might strengthen the role of the European Parliament in the policymaking process of the European Union. Using simple game theory, the paper analyzes the working properties of the different implementation procedures that are known as 'comitology'....

This paper challenges the assertion that European politics would be closer to the citizens´ preferences if decision power were transferred from the Council of Ministers to the European Parliament. On the one hand, citizens benefit from a greater transparency in the Parliament´s debates...

The EU's revenue system is still typical for an organisation based on international cooperation and stands in contrast to the Union's far advanced legislative and political role. This contrast feeds the debate on granting the EU an autonomous tax source. Our contribution explores the factors...

Over the past four decades, the accumulation of policy legacies and public debt has led to a decline in fiscal flexibility in Germany and the United States. By applying an index of fiscal democracy to Germany, the paper illustrates the associated shrinkage of democratic control over budget...

Erhöhungen der eigenen Bezüge durch die Parlamentarier rufen in der Öffentlichkeit immer wieder Empörung hervor. Welche Rolle spielt das individuelle Risiko der Abgeordneten, nach dem Ende des Mandats von Einkommenseinbußen und Arbeitslosigkeit betroffen zu sein? Welche Konsequenzen ergeben...

In this paper we analyze a legislative bargaining game in which parties privately informed about their preferences bargain over an ideological and a distributive decision. Communication takes place before a proposal is offered and majority rule voting determines the outcome. When the private...