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Fair agreements for sharing international rivers with multiple springs and externalities
Brink, René van den; Laan, Gerard van der; Moes, Nigel - 2010
the unique welfare distribution that is core-stable and satisfies the condition that no agent gets a utility payoff above … has an increasing benefit function (no externalities) then every weighted hierarchical solution is core-stable. In case of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011381991
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The partnered core of an economy
Page, Frank H.; Wooders, Myrna Holtz - 1995
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000912932
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The partnered core of a game with side payments
Reny, Philip J.; Winter, Eyal; Wooders, Myrna Holtz - 1993
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000877430
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Three theorems on non-emptiness of approximate cores
Kovalenkov, Alexander; Wooders, Myrna Holtz - 1997
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000974739
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Equivalence of the core and competitive equilibrium in a Tiebout economy with crowding types
Conley, John P.; Wooders, Myrna Holtz - 1995 - Rev
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000918084
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An axiomatization of the core for finite and continuum games
Winter, Elmar Edmund - 1990
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000792453
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Inessentiality of large coalitions and the approximate core property : 2 equivalence theorems
Wooders, Myrna Holtz - 1990 - 1. version
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000792480
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The partnered core of a game without side payments
Reny, Philip J. - In: Journal of economic theory 70 (1996) 2, pp. 298-311
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001206851
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An extension of the KKMS Theorem
Reny, Philip J. - In: Journal of mathematical economics 29 (1998) 2, pp. 125-134
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001241725
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Computation of the nucleolus for a class of disjunctive games with a permission structure
Brink, René van den; Katsev, Ilya; Laan, Gerard van der - 2008
A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (single-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. A well-known solution is the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011376532