We build a model of conflict in which two groups contest a resource and must decide on the optimal allocation of labor between fighting and productive activities. In this setting, a diaspora emanating from one of the two groups can get actively involved in the conflict by transferring financial...

How does the reform of state institutions shape prospects for peace after war? Existing research on the institutional causes of peace focuses on how institutional designs, as the outcomes of reform processes, reduce post‐conflict violence and promote peace. The literature does not, however,...

We investigate the implications of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) for interstate confl ict. We set up a two-stage game with three competing importers, where fi rst, two of the countries decide on whether to initiate war against each other, and subsequently, all three countries select their...

In countries where civil war has formally ended, not all refugees return. Nor does emigration come to a halt. Why? We argue that three specific features of post‐war situations explain the varying levels of outward migration: the quality of peace, the quality of political institutions, and the...

Donor reactions to recent settlements of internal conflicts have been highly diverse, in terms of both overall aid and its sectoral composition. The allocation of post-conflict aid tends to be needs-based by favoring particularly poor countries. There is no conclusive evidence, however, that the...