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Justice has great latitude in recommending corporate cartel fines to the federal courts, and its recommendations are nearly … direct test of the optimal deterrence theory of antitrust crimes.Regressions are fitted to a sample of the corporations that …-deterrence model is quite good. We find that U.S. corporate cartel fines are strongly directly related to economic injuries from …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012979998
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012022643
Sophisticated collusive compensation schemes such as assigning future market shares or direct transfers are frequently observed in detected cartels. We show formally why these schemes are useful for dampening deviation incentives when colluding firms are temporary asymmetric. The relative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012704975
We analyze the effects of better algorithmic demand forecasting on collusive profits. We show that the comparative statics crucially depend on the whether actions are observable. Thus, the optimal antitrust policy needs to take into account the institutional settings of the industry in question....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012990230
This article distills insights about cartel formation from 41 cases prosecuted by the European Commission between 2001 … following potential causes for cartel formation: Changes in prices, demand and customer conduct, capacity utilization, increased … imports and entry by competitors, and events in the legal and regulatory environment of the firms. Cartel formation is not …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012997727
Sophisticated collusive compensation schemes such as assigning future market shares or direct transfers are frequently observed in detected cartels. We show formally why these schemes are useful for dampening deviation incentives when colluding firms are temporary asymmetric. The relative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012698813
We analyze the effects of better algorithmic demand forecasting on collusive profits. We show that the comparative statics crucially depend on the whether actions are observable. Thus, the optimal antitrust policy needs to take into account the institutional settings of the industry in question....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013093034
We build a game-theoretic model to examine how better demand forecasting due to algorithms, machine learning and artificial intelligence affects the sustainability of collusion in an industry. We find that while better forecasting allows colluding firms to better tailor prices to demand...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012910026
I study the predictability of the EC’s merger decision procedure before and after the 2004 merger policy reform based on a dataset covering all affected markets of mergers with an official decision documented by DG Comp between 1990 and 2014. Using the highly flexible, non-parametric random...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011995257
Scholars and enforcement officials debate the merits and implications of “behavioral antitrust” — the application of empirical evidence showing how human behavior departs systematically and predictably from strict rationality (“bounded rationality”) to antitrust law. Notwithstanding...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012999218