We analyze the strategic behavior of firms when demand is determined by a rule of thumb behavior of consumers. We assume consumer dynamics where individual consumers follow simple behavioral decision rules governed by imitation and habit as suggested in consumer research. On this basis, we...

We define an indirect evolutionary approach formally and apply it to (Tullock) contests. While it is known (Leininger, 2003) that the direct evolutionary approach in the form of finite population ESS (Schaffer, 1988) yields more aggressive behavior than in Nash equilibrium, it is now shown that...

We define an indirect evolutionary approach formally and apply it to (Tullock)contests. While it is known (Leininger, 2003) that the direct evolutionary approach in the form of finite population ESS (Schaffer, 1988) yields more aggressive behavior than in Nash equilibrium, it is now shown that...

This paper aims to identify the cost characteristics of exiting firms whenever firms are playing an infinite horizon supergame with time-invariant cost and demand functions. With more than two firms, the problem of which firms exit is quite similar to a coalition formation one. Solving this...

I study a market model in which profit-maximizing firms compete in multi-dimensional pricing strategies over a consumer, who is limited in his ability to grasp such complicated objects and therefore uses a sampling procedure to evaluate them. Firms respond to increased competition with an...

Concerned with the risk of supplier default, a firm may choose to diversify its orders among multiple suppliers. Furthermore, the discrepancy in production lead-times among suppliers furnishes a firm with a valuable option to defer ordering decisions until uncertainty has been partially...

We study the effects of disruption risk in a supply chain where one retailer deals with competing risky suppliers who may default during their production lead-times. The suppliers, who compete for business with the retailer by establishing wholesale prices, are leaders in a Stackelberg game with...

A market model is presented, in which firms and consumers differ in their market understanding. In the model, rational firms compete in probability distributions over consumers with bounded ability to grasp statistical data. Increased competition causes firms to increase their effort to...

We define an indirect evolutionary approach formally and apply it to (Tullock) contests. While it is known (Leininger, 2003) that the direct evolutionary approach in the form of finite population ESS (Schaffer, 1988) yields more aggressive behavior than in Nash equilibrium, it is now shown that...