Showing 1 - 10 of 11
We address the impact of corruption in a developing economy in the context of an empirically relevant hold-up problem - when a foreign firm sinks an investment to provide infrastructure services. We focus on the structure of the economy's bureaucracy, which can be centralized or decentralized,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267880
In many transition economies, insiders controlled state-owned firms, de facto. For such firms, we model the decision about privatization method, focusing on the choice between free distribution (so called 'mass privatization') and management-employee buyouts. We incorporate a political...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011470762
We analyze the provision of infrastructure by a foreign investor when the domestic bureaucracy is corrupt, but puts some weight on domestic welfare. The investor may pay a bribe in return for a higher provisional contract price. After the investment has been sunk, the bureaucracy may hold up the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011872622
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011875701
In many transition economies, insiders controlled state-owned firms, de facto. For such firms, we model the decision about privatization method, focusing on the choice between free distribution (so called ‘mass privatization’) and management-employee buyouts. We incorporate a political...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003342111
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003391480
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003402388
We address the impact of corruption in a developing economy in the context of an empirically relevant hold-up problem - when a foreign firm sinks an investment to provide infrastructure services. We focus on the structure of the economy's bureaucracy, which can be centralized or decentralized,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003330459
We analyze the provision of infrastructure by a foreign investor when the domestic bureaucracy is corrupt, but puts some weight on domestic welfare. The investor may pay a bribe in return for a higher provisional contract price. After the investment has been sunk, the bureaucracy may hold up the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012915722
We address the impact of corruption in a developing economy in the context of an empirically relevant hold-up problem - when a foreign firm sinks an investment to provide infrastructure services. We focus on the structure of the economy's bureaucracy, which can be centralized or decentralized,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012778446