In this study, we investigate why CEOs seem to be held more accountable for poor firm performance in some countries than others. We integrate research from comparative corporate governance and agency theory to identify and evaluate four fundamental assumptions underlying most theoretical...

This paper examines whether CEOs with shorter initial contract lengths suffer from greater pressure and consequently engage in more visible efforts via mergers and acquisitions (M&As). By using CEO initial fixed-term contracts and exploiting U.K. corporate governance reform as an exogenous...

Chapter 1: Covid and the seven deadly sins -- Chapter 2: Evil: reality and imagination -- Chapter 3: The psychology of white-collar criminals -- Chapter 4: The dance macabre of shame -- Chapter 5: Catching the thief of time: the perils of procrastination -- Chapter 6: The inner theatre of the...

Research summary: Using a principal-principal agency theory lens we examine corporate governance and compensation design in family-owned businesses. We conceptualize how CEO pay and pay-performance sensitivity is influenced by whether the CEO is a professional or drawn from the controlling...