Two suppliers of a homogenous good know that, in the second period, they will be able to collude. Gains from collusion are split according to the Nash bargaining solution. In the first period, either of them is able to invest into process innovation. Innovation changes the status quo pay-off,...

Die starken Preissteigerungen für Benzin in den letzten 2 Jahren sind häufig auf mangelnden Wettbewerb zurückgeführt worden. Die These wird überprüft, indem die Wettbewerbsstruktur bei Tankstellen und deren Vorleistungsbeziehungen dargestellt werden und ökonometrische Schätzungen über...

In reviewing the theoretical and empirical literature on collusion, this paper distills methods for detecting cartels and distinguishing collusion from competition.

This paper studies competition in the German market for mobile telecommunications, motivated by recent suggestions that T-Mobile and Vodafone possess a position of collective dominance. Allegedly, their position of joint dominance is secured through a combination of first-mover advantages and...

This paper explores the effects that collusion can have in newspaper markets where firms compete for advertising as well as for readership. We compare three modes of competition: i) competition in the advertising and the reader market, ii) semi-collusion over advertising (with competition in the...

This paper analyzes the effect of cooperation in manufacturing on firms' inclination to collude in the market. Compared to non-cooperation in manufacturing, coordination of the investments in production yields a higher competitive profit. If firms intensify cooperation and produce in a joint...

Der Beitrag sollte verdeutlichen, dass sich seit den Pioniermodellen mit unvollständiger Information mittlerweile eine recht heterogene Klasse von Ansätzen etabliert hat, die sich unter alternativen Grundannahmen mit der Frage auseinandersetzen, ob Unternehmen angesichts diverser...

The purpose of this article is to analyze how the presence of a competitive fringe, composed by price taker firms, can affect the sustainability of collusive equilibria. Our starting point is that there exists a diffused misunderstanding about its strategical role as collusive minus factor. We...

In their merger control, EU and the US have considered symmetric size distribution (cost structure) of firms to be a factor potentially leading to collusion. We show that forbidding mergers leading to symmetric market structures can induce mergers leading to asymmetric market structures with...