This paper analyzes if men and women are expected to behave dif- ferently regarding altruism. Since the dictator game provides the most suitable design for studying altruism and generosity in the lab setting, we use a modi.ed version to study the beliefs involved in the game. Our results are...

This paper provides experimental evidence on how players predict end game effects in a linear public good game. Our regression analysis yields a measure of the relative importance of priors and signals on subjects’ beliefs and let us conclude that, first, the weight of the signal is relatively...

Over the last two decades there has been a complex debate about the nature and limits of the consequentialism. Using these ideas this paper revises giving (altruism) in experimental dicatator games. We use results from several experimental papers plus an experiment ad-hoc designed to motivate...

This paper analyzes the impact of social integration on cooperative behavior. We show that if the social network shows assortative mixing then conditional cooperation is an equilibrium strategy for altruistic subjects with a high degree of social integration.We provide experimental evidence on...

Ideally we would like subjects of experiments to be perfect strangers so that the situation they face at the lab is not just a part of a long run interaction. Unfortunately, it is not easy to reach those conditions and experimenters try to mitigate any effects coming form these out-of- the-lab...

This paper provides novel results for the extensive literature on dictator games: recipients do not expect dictators to behave selfishly, but instead expect the equal split division. We performed a field experiment in Baja California among a population of unexperienced subjects. Using monetary...

Recent papers on double-blind dictator games have obtained significant generous behavior when information regarding recipient is provided. But the lack of information disincentives other-regarding behavior and then, the subject’s behavior closely approximates the game theoretic prediction...

This paper provides an empirical demonstration of high stakes incentives in relation to religious practice. It shows that, when both positive (carrot) and negative (stick) incentives are available, the former are more effective than the latter. Specifically, it is shown that beliefs in heaven...

A number of recent papers on double-blind dictator games have obtained significant generous behavior when information regarding the recipient or any other social context is provided. In contrast, the lack of information discourages other-regarding behavior and the subject’s behavior closely...

"Si él lo necesita" (if he really needs it) was the most common argument given by the subjects who accepted the zero offer in the ultimatum game during experiments were conducted among illiterate (adult) gypsies in Vallecas, Madrid. Interestingly the acceptance of the zero offer was not a rare...