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Do large cabinets favor large governments?: Evidence from Swiss sub-federal jurisdictions
Schaltegger, Christoph A.; Feld, Lars P. - 2004
The fiscal commons problem is one of the most prominent explanations of excessive spending and indebtedness in political economics. The more fragmented a government, the higher its spending, deficits and debt. In this paper we investigate to what extent this problem can be mitigated by different...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010265723
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Do Large Cabinets Favor Large Governments? Evidence from Swiss Sub-federal Jurisdictions
Schaltegger, Christoph A.; Feld, Lars P. - Center for Research in Economics, Management and the … - 2004
The fiscal commons problem is one of the most prominent explanations of excessive spending and indebtedness in political economics. The more fragmented a government, the higher its spending, deficits and debt. In this paper we investigate to what extent this problem can be miti-gated by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005226983
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Do Large Cabinets Favor Large Governments? Evidence from Swiss Sub-federal Jurisdictions
Feld, Lars P.; Schaltegger, Christoph A. - Volkswirtschaft Abteilung, Fachbereich … - 2004
The fiscal commons problem is one of the most prominent explanations of excessive spending and indebtedness in political economics. The more fragmented a government, the higher its spending, deficits and debt. In this paper we investigate to what extent this problem can be mitigated by different...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005209058
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Do Large Cabinets Favor Large Governments? Evidence from Swiss Sub-federal Jurisdictions
Schaltegger, Christoph A.; Feld, Lars P. - 2004
The fiscal commons problem is one of the most prominent explanations of excessive spending and indebtedness in political economics. The more fragmented a government, the higher its spending, deficits and debt. In this paper we investigate to what extent this problem can be miti-gated by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012168185
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Do Large Cabinets Favor Large Governments? Evidence on Institutional Restraints on the Fiscal Commons Problem for Swiss Cantons
Schaltegger, Christoph A.; Feld, Lars P. - 2008
The fiscal commons problem is one of the most prominent explanations of excessive spending in political economics. The more fragmented a government, the higher its spending. In this paper we investigate to what extent this problem can be mitigated by different fiscal or constitutional...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012168288
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Do Large Cabinets Favor Large Governments? Evidence on Institutional Restraints on the Fiscal Commons Problem for Swiss Cantons
Schaltegger, Christoph A.; Feld, Lars P. - Center for Research in Economics, Management and the … - 2008
The fiscal commons problem is one of the most prominent explanations of excessive spending in political economics. The more fragmented a government, the higher its spending. In this paper we investigate to what extent this problem can be mitigated by different fiscal or constitutional...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005808591