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Sovereign default risk and commitment for fiscal adjustment
Gonçalves, Carlos Eduardo; Guimarães, Bernardo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012
This paper studies fiscal policy in a model of sovereign debt and default. A time-inconsistency problem arises: since the price of past debt cannot be affected by current fiscal policy and governments cannot credibly commit to a certain path of tax rates, debtor countries choose suboptimally low...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083643
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Conditionality and Ownership in IMF Lending: A Political Economy Approach
Drazen, Allan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
The relation between IMF conditionality and country ownership of assistance programs is considered from a political …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005788965
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Dollarization, Bailouts and the Stability of the Banking System
Gale, Douglas M; Vives, Xavier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001
obtained are applied to assess the desirability of dollarization in a range of countries and the potential role of the IMF as …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005788955
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Estimating Loss Function Parameters
Elliott, Graham; Komunjer, Ivana; Timmermann, Allan G - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
and asymptotic distributional results for these parameters. The methods are applied in an empirical analysis of IMF and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791975
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The Use of SDRs in the Financing of Official Safety-net Mechanisms
De Cecco, Marcello; Giavazzi, Francesco - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1996
The question addressed in this paper is whether the IMF should be involved in Mexico-style crises and, if the answer is … positive, whether the existing IMF financing mechanisms are adequate – both in terms of the volume of funds that can be … countries, and the justification for IMF intervention lies in the ability of this institution, compared with international …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123583
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The Bail-In Problem: Systematic Goals, Ad Hoc Means
Eichengreen, Barry; Ruehl, Christoph - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000
In this paper we analyse the recent efforts of the international financial institutions to limit the moral hazard created by their assistance to crisis countries. We question the wisdom of the case-by-case approach taken in Pakistan, Ecuador, Romania and Ukraine. We show that because default and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124195
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Which International Institutions Promote International Trade?
Rose, Andrew K - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
International Monetary Fund (IMF); and 3) the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). I use a standard … indicate that OECD membership (but neither GATT/WTO nor IMF membership) has had a consistently large positive effect on trade. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504751
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Would Collective Action Clauses Raise Borrowing Costs?
Eichengreen, Barry; Mody, Ashoka - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999
We examine the implications for borrowing costs of including collective-action clauses in loan contracts. For a sample of some 2,000 international bonds, we compare the spreads on bonds subject to UK governing law, which typically include collective-action clauses, with spreads on bonds subject...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067390
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On the Role and Eects of IMF Seniority
Saravia, Diego - Econometric Society - 2004
The paper presents a three period model that studies the eects of IMF loans on borrowers’ and lenders’ welfare … highlighting the fact that the IMF has both de jure and de facto seniority rights over private creditors. It is shown that an IMF … IMF intervention always makes the borrower country better off. The eects on non-senior lenders depend on the size of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005699628
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Temporary Tariffs and Capital Market Restrictions
Jafarey, Saqib; Lahiri, Sajal - Econometric Society - 2004
We develop a two-period model with endogenous investment and credit flows. Credit is subject to quantitative restrictions. With an exogenous restriction, we analyze the welfare effects of temporary tariffs. We then consider three scenarios under which a monopoly lender optimally decides the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342183