The main conclusions of this paper are the following. In order to minimize switching costs, the name of the new EU currency should be the Deutschmark. Differential national requirements for seigniorage revenue provide a weak case for retaining national monetary independence. From the point of...

The ‘Stability Pact’ agreed at the Dublin Summit in December 1996 and concluded at the Amsterdam European Council in June 1997 prescribes sanctions for countries that breach the Maastricht deficit ceiling in stage three of European Monetary Union. This paper explores possible motivations for...

In this paper we analyse the likely effects of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) on European unemployment. We start by describing the current unemployment situation in the European Union (EU). In so doing, we try to assess the relative importance of European, national and regional shocks in...

According to the Maastricht Treaty, EMS countries will be able to join EMU if their inflation rates are not more than 1.5% higher than the average of the three lowest inflation rates in the EMS. In this paper I analyse the likelihood of inflation rates converging to the levels set out in the...

If the third stage of monetary union in Europe begins on 1 January 1999, not all EU countries will participate: two, with opt-out clauses, may choose to stay out; others will have a derogation because they do not fulfil the required conditions. The Maastricht Treaty, while silent on the regime...

We show how a stability pact based on deficit sanctions eliminates the exacerbation of debt accumulation that may arise from monetary unification. Moreover, by making sanctions contingent upon the economic situation of countries, the stability pact provides for risk sharing. Differences in...

Avocates of formal fiscal restraints on the member states of the European Monetary Union often argue that US experience proves that a monetary union needs such constraints to guarantee the stability of the common currency. We show, first, that the origin of formal fiscal restraints on US state...

This paper discusses the conditions under which currency unions would be desirable and viable. We discuss and present new empirical evidence concerning the operation of existing currency unions in federal states and among regional country groupings. In particular, we examine the traditional...

Does a monetary union need fiscal shock absorbers helping the participating countries to cope with asymmetric shocks? The consensus in the debate over EMU argues that the answer is yes. In this paper, we revisit the issue, building on a dynamic, general equilibrium framework of regions in a...

Policy-makers’ incentives to undertake costly reform depends on the international monetary system. We consider the effect of monetary regimes on labour market reform. We find international negotiation of monetary policy produces less reform than non-cooperation. Reform is lowest of all with...