fairness, as an imposed sequence of offers, as a source of transaction cost and as a species of conflict. Also discussed is the … are struck. We have no explanation of bargaining, comparable to the general equilibrium in the economy, accounting for … essential features of bargaining as we know it with reference to universal self-interested behaviour subject only to economy …

systematically refutes the self-interest hypothesis and suggests that many people are strongly motivated by concerns for fairness and … insights into the nature of preferences and into the relative performance of competing theories of fairness. The purpose of …

systematically refutes the self-interest hypothesis and suggests that many people are strongly motivated by concerns for fairness and … insights into the nature of preferences and into the relative performance of competing theories of fairness. The purpose of …

systematically refutes the self-interest hypothesis and suggests that many people are strongly motivated by concerns for fairness and … insights into the nature of preferences and into the relative performance of competing theories of fairness. The purpose of …

We extend the Baron and Ferejohn (1989) model of multilateral bargaining by allowing the players to attempt commiting … to a bargaining position prior to negotiating. If successful, commitment binds a player to reject any proposal which … reason is that competition to be included in the winning coalition discourages attempts to commit to an aggressive bargaining …

making. We do so in the context of a distributive multilateral bargaining model featuring strategic pre-commitment. Prior to … each bargaining round, players can declare a minimum share that they must receive in return for their vote. Such …

We study whether the Coase conjecture holds in a model of bargaining during conflict due to Powell and Fearon. Two … players, A and B, contest a divisible resource. At any time during the conflict, they can make a binding agreement to share … the resource. The conflict continues until they make an agreement or one side collapses. Player B privately knows w hether …

We study whether the Coase conjecture holds in a model of bargaining during conflict due to Powell and Fearon. Two … players, A and B, contest a divisible resource. At any time during the conflict, they can make a binding agreement to share … the resource. The conflict continues until they make an agreement or one side collapses. Player B privately knows w hether …

We extend the Baron and Ferejohn (1989) model of multilateral bargaining by allowing the players to attempt commiting … to a bargaining position prior to negotiating. If successful, commitment binds a player to reject any proposal which … reason is that competition to be included in the winning coalition discourages attempts to commit to an aggressive bargaining …