various axiomatizations of these solutions can be found. Axiomatizations of the Shapley value often use efficiency which is … the equal division solution. Further, we show that there is no solution that satisfies efficiency, collusion neutrality … and the null player property. Finally, we show that a solution satisfies efficiency, collusion neutrality and linearity if …

use efficiency which is not satisfied by the Banzhaf value. On the other hand, the Banzhaf value satisfies collusion … these axioms characterize the equal division solution. Further, we show that there is no solution that satisfies efficiency …, collusion neutrality and the null player property. Finally, we show that a solution satisfies efficiency, collusion neutrality …

use efficiency which is not satisfied by the Banzhaf value. On the other hand, the Banzhaf value satisfies collusion … these axioms characterize the equal division solution. Further, we show that there is no solution that satisfies efficiency …, collusion neutrality and the null player property. Finally, we show that a solution satisfies efficiency, collusion neutrality …

satisfies collusion neutrality, while the Myerson value satisfies component efficiency. Requiring both efficiency and collusion …. Since these solutions also satisfy the superfluous player property, this also `solves' an impossibility for TU-games since … there is no solution for these games that satisfies efficiency, collusion neutrality and the null player property. We give …

satisfies collusion neutrality, while the Myerson value satisfies component efficiency. Requiring both efficiency and collusion …. Since these solutions also satisfy the superfluous player property, this also `solves' an impossibility for TU-games since … there is no solution for these games that satisfies efficiency, collusion neutrality and the null player property. We give …

satisfies collusion neutrality, while the Myerson value satisfies component efficiency. Requiring both efficiency and collusion …. Since these solutions also satisfy the superfluous player property, this also `solves' an impossibility for TU-games since … there is no solution for these games that satisfies efficiency, collusion neutrality and the null player property. We give …