Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 5,978
Cover Image
Efficiency and collusion neutrality in cooperative games and networks
van den Brink, René - In: Games and Economic Behavior 76 (2012) 1, pp. 344-348
the Shapley value satisfying efficiency and the Banzhaf value satisfying collusion neutrality. Both properties seem to be … desirable. In this paper, we show that there is no solution satisfying efficiency, collusion neutrality and the null player … property. After that we show that this impossibility is resolved when cooperation among players is restricted by a cycle …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010664598
Cover Image
A new outside option value for networks : the Kappa-value : measuring distribution of power of political agreements
Belau-Garmann, Julia - 2012
In an economic or social situation where agents have to group in order to achieve common goals, how can we calculate the coalitional rents of the agents arising from the coalition formation? Once we have formalized the situation via a TU-game and a network describing the economic structure, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009579247
Cover Image
An axiomatic characterization of a value for games in partition function form
Hu, Cheng-Cheng; Yang, Yi-You - In: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 1 (2010) 4, pp. 475-487
An extension of the Shapley value for games in partition function form is proposed in the paper. We introduce a version of the marginal contributions for environments with externalities. The dummy property related to it is defined. We adapt the system of axioms provided by Shapley (A value for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009355896
Cover Image
On the impact of independence of irrelevant alternatives : the case of two-person NTU games
Peleg, Bezalel; Sudhölter, Peter; Zarzuelo, José M. - In: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 3 (2012) 1/2, pp. 143-156
by six axioms: Non-emptiness, efficiency, unanimity, scale covariance, conditional additivity, and independence of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009506430
Cover Image
Sharing a polluted river through environmental taxes
Gómez-Rúa, María - In: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 4 (2013) 2, pp. 137-153
n agents located along a river generate residues that then require cleaning to return the river to its natural state, which entails some cost. We propose several rules to distribute the total pollutant-cleaning cost among all the agents. We provide axiomatic characterizations using properties...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009756937
Cover Image
Auctioning and selling positions: A non-cooperative approach to queueing conflicts
Ju, Yuan; Chun, Youngsub; van den Brink, René - In: Journal of Economic Theory 153 (2014) C, pp. 33-45
Complementary to the axiomatic and mechanism design studies on queueing problems, this paper proposes a strategic bargaining approach to resolve queueing conflicts. Given a situation where players with different waiting costs have to form a queue in order to be served, they firstly compete with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010930793
Cover Image
MEASURING THE POWER OF PARTIES WITHIN GOVERNMENT COALITIONS
WIESE, HARALD - In: International Game Theory Review (IGTR) 09 (2007) 02, pp. 307-322
The paper presents a coalition-structure value that is meant to capture outside options of players in a cooperative game. It deviates from the Aumann-Drèze value by violating the null-player axiom. We use this value as a power index and apply it to weighted majority games.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005081055
Cover Image
Chapter 6 Axiomatic cost and surplus sharing
Moulin, Hervé - In: Handbook of social choice and welfare : volume 1, (pp. 289-357). 2002
The equitable division of a joint cost (or a jointly produced output) among agents with different shares or types of output (or input) commodities, is a central theme of the theory of cooperative games with transferable utility. Ever since Shapley's seminal contribution in 1953, this question...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014023837
Cover Image
Chapter 58 Some other economic applications of the value
Mertens, Jean-François - In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications : …, (pp. 2185-2201). 2002
Selected applications of the NTU Shapley value to settings other than that of general equilibrium in perfect competition. Three models are considered: Taxation and Redistribution, Public Goods, and Fixed Prices. In each case, the value leads to significant conceptual insights which, while...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024487
Cover Image
Chapter 55 Values of non-transferable utility games
McLean, Richard P. - In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications : …, (pp. 2077-2120). 2002
This chapter surveys a class of solution concepts for n -person games without transferable utility — NTU games for short — that are based on varying notions of “fair division”. An NTU game is a specification of payoffs attainable by members of each coalition through some joint course of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024490