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Efficiency and Collusion Neutrality of Solutions for Cooperative TU-Games
Brink, Rene van den - Tinbergen Instituut - 2009
various axiomatizations of these solutions can be found. Axiomatizations of the Shapley value often use efficiency which is … the equal division solution. Further, we show that there is no solution that satisfies efficiency, collusion neutrality … and the null player property. Finally, we show that a solution satisfies efficiency, collusion neutrality and linearity if …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256444
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Comparable Axiomatizations of the Myerson Value, the Restricted Banzhaf Value, Hierarchical Outcomes and the Average Tree Solution for Cycle-Free Graph Restricted Games
Brink, René van den - Tinbergen Institute - 2009
satisfies collusion neutrality, while the Myerson value satisfies component efficiency. Requiring both efficiency and collusion …. Since these solutions also satisfy the superfluous player property, this also `solves' an impossibility for TU-games since … there is no solution for these games that satisfies efficiency, collusion neutrality and the null player property. We give …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008513218
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Comparable Axiomatizations of the Myerson Value, the Restricted Banzhaf Value, Hierarchical Outcomes and the Average Tree Solution for Cycle-Free Graph Restricted Games
Brink, René van den - Tinbergen Instituut - 2009
satisfies collusion neutrality, while the Myerson value satisfies component efficiency. Requiring both efficiency and collusion …. Since these solutions also satisfy the superfluous player property, this also `solves' an impossibility for TU-games since … there is no solution for these games that satisfies efficiency, collusion neutrality and the null player property. We give …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256580
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Multi-Player Agents in Cooperative TU-Games
Brink, Rene van den; Dietz, Chris - Tinbergen Instituut - 2012
A situation in which a finite set of agents can generate certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility (or simply a TU-game) where each agent is represented by one player in the game. In this paper, we assume that one agent can be represented by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255881
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Multi-Player Agents in Cooperative TU-Games
Brink, Rene van den; Dietz, Chris - Tinbergen Institute - 2012
A situation in which a finite set of agents can generate certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility (or simply a TU-game) where each agent is represented by one player in the game. In this paper, we assume that one agent can be represented by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009391880
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Consistency, Monotonicity and Implementation of Egalitarian Shapley Values
Brink, René van den; Funaki, Yukihiko; Ju, Yuan - Tinbergen Instituut - 2007
One of the main issues in economics is the trade-off between marginalism and egalitarianism. In the context of cooperative games this trade-off can be framed as one of choosing to allocate according to the Shapley value or the equal division solution. In this paper we provide tools that make it...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255779
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Consistency, Monotonicity and Implementation of Egalitarian Shapley Values
Brink, René van den; Funaki, Yukihiko; Ju, Yuan - Tinbergen Institute - 2007
One of the main issues in economics is the trade-off between marginalism and egalitarianism. In the context of cooperative games this trade-off can be framed as one of choosing to allocate according to the Shapley value or the equal division solution. In this paper we provide tools that make it...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144455
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Allocation rules for museum pass programs
Béal, Sylvain; Solal, Philippe - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009
We consider natural axioms for allocating the income of museum pass programs. Two allocation rules are characterized and are shown to coincide with the Shapley value and the equal division solution of the associated TU-game introduced by Ginsburgh and Zang (2003).
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008543490
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Axiomatization and Implementation of Discounted Shapley Values
Brink, Rene van den; Funaki, Yukihiko - Tinbergen Institute - 2010
player property for delta = 0. We show that efficiency, symmetry, linearity and this delta-reducing player property …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838630
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Axiomatization and Implementation of Discounted Shapley Values
Brink, Rene van den; Funaki, Yukihiko - Tinbergen Instituut - 2010
player property for delta = 0. We show that efficiency, symmetry, linearity and this delta-reducing player property …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257081