We model the process of coalition formation in the 16th German Bundestag as a hedonic coalition formation game. In order to induce players' preferences in the game we apply the Shapley value of the simple game describing all winning coalitions in the Bundestag. Using different stability notions...

The discussion about employee representation on supervisory boards has received much attention from scholars and politicians around the world. We provide new insights to this ongoing debate by employing power indices from game theory to examine the "real" power of employees on boards and its...

Nach langwierigen Verhandlungen haben sich CDU/CSU und SPD auf einen Koalitionsvertrag geeinigt und eine gemeinsame Regierung gebildet. In diesem Beitrag wird analysiert, wie verschiedene Koalitionsaussagen der Parteien im Vorfeld der Bundestagswahl 2013 die Verteilung der Macht in der...

The supervisory board of Porsche SE, after a successful takeover of Volkswagen AG, was supposed to consist of three groups: The Porsche shareholders would have been endowed with 6 seats, while the 324,000 Volkswagen employees and the 12,000 Porsche employees would have been represented by 3...

This paper compares the poverty reduction impact of income sources, taxes and transfers across five OECD countries. Since the estimation of that impact can depend on the order in which the various income sources are introduced into the analysis, it is done by using the Shapley value. Estimates...

Quotas for special groups of students often apply in school or university admission procedures. This paper studies the performance of two mechanisms to implement such quotas in a lab experiment. The first mechanism is a simplified version of the mechanism currently employed by the German central...